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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The District Court did not err by imposing an additional and much lengthier suspension on
an attorney, a solo practitioner, found to have violated the Court's previous order of suspension, even
when the additional suspension is four fold that of the first; as a greatly magnified sanction is
particularly warranted when the violation or injury to the legal system shows of a complete lack of
respect to the legal profession or causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the public in general.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rules
Rule 3. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions.
3.1 Generally
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct:
(a)

the duty violated;

(b)

the lawyer's mental state;

(c)

the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and

(d)

the existence of aggravating or mitigation factors.

Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions.
4.3

Suspension.

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)

knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to
a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential
interference with a legal proceeding; or

(b)

engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Standard
1

4.2(b) 1: i it ne\ ertheless seriously adversely reflects on the layer's fitness to practice
law
STATKMLN 1 OF THE CASE
Nature of Hit1 <'a1-

.in.s is aji Attorney discipline case.

Disposition in the District Coi n It: I h 3 Disti ict Cc \ 11: I: imposed a sanction c 10 !!|i ppellee of
a one year suspension.

w \m i<\ AN 1 IM is
1.

Appellee's attempts 10 make adjustments for his declining health have been inadeaimh- in

safeguarding the public and the integrity of the legal profession. Appellee was the sole .mil i<. -s o* > history whose pi ol mii'lutlc'il .1 line 1 ollapse of 1 Mieersshil I iini lin ilt '-liiictioi.
marriage, and virtually the complete loss of what any person philosophically terms self.
2.

In i'lic Minnik'1 tf IW(>, Appellee's employees confronted - appellee „i*wul iiuir concerns

regarding his frightful increase in memory lapses, violent mood swings, missing hearings and office
appointments, an ^viing inevitably to complaints to the Utah Bar. Finally, advise from, medical
ad visors who were woikiiij: *

*, , * \ n-v .' MI\

conclude that he needed time to recuperate and in September i' Wl), lie transfer his files to neighbor!)
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\ ppellee's return to work in April ?iM) I w;is premature but nonetheless, Appellee brought new
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and in some ways easier to control due to the small number of clients in a limited ,nva of pi;ii lin < In
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4.

As 2001 began to fade into late winter, Appellee settled his case with the Bar and agreed to

a three month suspension for failing to timely file a complaint, committed prior to his sabbatical.
During this same period, Appellee concluded his second divorce, had an apartment, and a new fiance.
5.

After marrying his fiance in February 2002, Appellee began transferring his files in

preparation for the three month suspension that was scheduled for March, April and May 2002.
Appellee's entire case load included approximately 23 clients. Management of such a small clientele
should not have been difficult for an attorney in meeting the suspension requirements.
6.

For reasons unknown to Appellee, his severe major depressive (bi-polar) disorder was

progressively having a destructive effect on his ability to practice law and, in particular, in managing
the difficult task of trying to reestablish his practice after an extended sabbatical during which
Appellee hoped to regain his health. As before, however, where Appellee's declining health lead to
his three month suspension, Appellee again found his health interfering with the decisions he was
making that led to a continued and much lengthier suspension period.
7.

On or about June 1, 2002, Appellee filed an affidavit of compliance. The Utah Bar

Association, through Kate Toomey, filed an objection and requested an Order to Show Cause,
alleging misconduct on Appellee's part during the suspension.
8.

Ms. Toomey provided various allegations intending to show that Appellee was holding himself

out as an attorney during the suspension and petitioned the District Court to disbar Appellee from
the practice of law, despite the evidence provided directly to Ms. Toomey regarding Appellee's health
and the apparent need that Appellee be placed on Disability Status as provided by the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
9.

Professionally, Appellee took a three month suspension and, seemingly without any ethical
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hesitation, multiplied his suspension four fold by means of turning simple choices into complex
decisions and actions; stumbling foolishly down a path of self destruction in contempt of the court's
order of suspension.
10.

During and prior to Appellee's original suspension, Appellee visited Ms. Toomey on several

occasions and discussed his difficulties in practicing law, particularly in relation to his physical and
emotional health problems. Appellee explained specifically that he was a disabled veteran with a
disability rating of 80% and that in addition to his various injuries and severe chronic pain, he also
had struggled through two divorces, one in 1999 and the other 2001. Appellee also reported that he
was under the care of a psychiatrist and psychologist in working with his severe depression and in
cooping with the effects of long term severe and chronic pain.
11.

On the occasions Appellee visited Ms. Toomey, he was asked specifically and repeatedly if

he had a drug addiction problem. Ms. Toomey explained that Appellee's situation could be mitigated
if, basically, Appellee was shooting Methamphetamine into his veins a couple time a day.
12.

Appellee failed to adequately convey to Ms. Toomey, and to the District Court, the depths

of his disabilities and that persons suffering from severe chronic depression, or manic depression, to
the degree suffered by Appellee, it is the exception to the rule where the person suffering such
illnesses is able to maintain stable employment. At the professional level, stable and full time
employment is very unlikely due to the high degree of stress and constant demands for critical and
very focused thinking.
13.

Though Appellee was not a drug addict, as petitioned by Ms. Toomey during the impersonal

meetings between the two, his medical condition did in fact lead to hospitalization on three occasions
for extreme mental health concerns during 1998 and 2000. A portion of Appellee's mental health
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concerns were related to Appellee's use of narcotic medications and combining them with alcohol
during emotional crises. Though Appellee may not have been addicted to pain medications as
commonly understood by the general public, or suffering from alcoholism, his use or abuse of pain
medications and alcohol during times of severe emotional distress were severe enough to lead to
hospitalizations during the period noted.
14.

Also in regard to addiction or abuse of medications, the level of narcotic medications Appellee

is prescribed to take on a daily basis, does in fact place Appellee at a specified level of addition where
Appellee MUST take the prescribed level of pain medications (morphine sulfate) or suffer a severe
withdrawal episode that takes five (5) to seven (7) days to run its course. For example, when
Appellee first began taking morphine sulfate, he was unaware that the dosage he was taking placed
him into a "controlled addiction" requiring strict adherence to the prescription instructions, including
the refilling of the prescription on the exact day it is due. Appellee had left town and missed his refill
appointment. By the third day, Appellee called the hospital and described all the symptoms common
to morphine withdrawal. After experiencing two withdrawals, Appellee no longer missed his refill
appointments.
15.

Appellee also told Ms. Toomey about his decision in 1999 to reduce his practice and take a

self-appointed leave of absence as he became aware of the affect his disabilities were having on his
performance because of comments he received from his employees and from opposing attorneys.
16.

Appellee's attempt to explain the actual basis for his behavior failed to connect with Ms.

Toomey who, rather than pursue the more obvious and factual need in seeking a disability status for
Appellee, was intent on in pursuing her head long, and head down, march to nothing less than
Appellee's disbarment.

5

17.

After the District Court had rendered its decision as to what actions on the part of Appellee

were violations of the Court's order of suspension, the Court requested arguments from both parties
regarding what further sanctions should be ordered.
18.

During Appellee's argument for Mitigation, Appellee, who represented himself during all the

proceedings, was unable to verbalize how his severe physical and mental conditions affected the
behavior illustrated by the evidence presented at the hearing. As before, when Appellee failed to
recognize how his medical conditions were affecting his practice during the time material to
Appellant's allegations, Appellee was equally unable to recognize or demonstrate to the Court how
his impairments affected the decisions he made during the suspension period which lead to the
allegations and findings of contempt.
19.

Appellee's apparent failure to argue knowledgeably regarding his impairments and how they

related to his actions led the court's denial of Appellee's arguments for mitigation based on his severe
physical and mental impairments and rendered an opinion accordingly.
20.

The court found that Appellee violated the previous order of suspension by: 1) holding

himself out as an attorney while presenting himself to officials at the Utah State Prison; 2) Appellee
filed a Reply to a motion involving another client during the suspension period; and 3) made contact
with a potential client during the suspension period who it was alleged had a potentially large claim
involving medical malpractice.
21.

In defense of these allegations, Appellee, who represented himself, presented facts and

arguments in an attempt to demonstrate to the Court his complete lack of intent to commit any act
whatsoever in contempt of the Court's prior order of suspension.
22.

Appellee's explanations of his actions while testifying on his own behalf are in themselves
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exhibits of the faulty nature of his mental health. For each allegation, Appellee testified of his
motivation for each action and his reasoning as to why such actions were not violations of the Court's
order of suspension.
23.

Appellee was given the opportunity to test his claimed motivations and explanations for his

actions through a vigorous cross-examination by Ms. Toomey. Of particular interest were those
moments during the examination when it became apparent to Appellee that his analysis of his actions
were faulty and he was therefore guilty of the alleged violations.
24.

As to the incident involving the prison (1), the attorney assigned to Appellee's cases during

the suspension was not available at the time the client requested the file and Appellee was traveling
to Salt Lake City the following day and agreed to drop off the requested copy. When Appellee
arrived at the prison, Appellee immediately gave the clerk at the prison his bar card for the explicit
purpose of having her determine his status. Appellee has made many trips to the prison for the
purpose of visiting and interviewing clients and was very familiar with the procedures for visiting
guests. Appellee was not clear, however, whether or not a Appellee who was suspended, but not
disbarred, could deliver a package or file to an inmate.
25.

Appellee attempted on numerous occasions to make it very clear to the Utah State Bar, Ms.

Toomey, and to the District Court, that he absolutely knew and absolutely depended on the clerk at
the prison to use his bar card to determine his status as an attorney. It was an absolute certainty that
Appellee knew the first step in entering the prison began with a check of his status with the Utah Bar.
26.

Given that Appellee was aware of the prison's procedure in checking an attorney's status, his

claim that he went to the prison to deliver a file to an inmate on behalf of another attorney, and his
claim that he was unsure as to whether the prison would allow a suspended, though not disbarred,
7

attorney to deliver a file is a reasonable claim in determining the veracity of Appellee's initial intent.
27.

Appellee stated in his testimony that he remained silent when handing the clerk his bar card

as he simply did not wish to vocally announce to the entire, though small, office that he was
suspended. Appellee knew that the individual who took the bar card would know he was suspended
but would also return with an answer to that very important question regarding his right of entry
without have to make his status an act of public pronouncement.
28.

The clerk who took the bar card to the back of the office and beyond the Appellee's sight, was

gone for a few minutes and then returned and asked Appellee to sign the prison log. The clerk did
not, however, state whether Appellee's suspended status was a bar to his entry. Nor did the clerk, nor
anyone else at the office ask Appellee's status or whether he was a suspended attorney. Appellee
proceeded to sign the prison log and continued with his intent to deliver the file to the inmate. In
signing the prison long, Appellee circled the "attorney of record" option and decided in his mind that
it was technically correct; and certainly more correct than the other options on the form. It was also
a fact that Appellee was listed on that particular case, and at that particular time, as the attorney of
record on the court docket. The only other option was for relatives of the inmate. This decision, and
Appellee's reasoning behind his decision, demonstrate the faulty way Appellee was reacting to a
stressful and embarrassing situation.
29.

The clerk then handed Appellee the annual forms visitors must sign as it had been more than

a year since Appellee's last visit. As the clerk had not given Appellee the answer yet as to whether
his suspended status would bar access, he continued down the slippery slope and signed the annual
forms as an attorney, and could no longer hide behind a technicality such as "attorney of record" as
such was no longer relevant to the annual forms. Appellee's inability to stop something that was step
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by step moving him outside what he believed to be the bounds of proper action, is indicative of the
manner in which his emotional and mental deficiencies affect seemingly simple decision making
requirements.
30.

It was only after Appellee finished the forms that the clerk went to the back of the office and

returned with the supervisor who asked Appellee to his office. As Appellee followed the supervisor
to his office, Appellee knew the answer to his question regarding entry, and also knew he was
methodically lead down a path of indiscretion before being informed that his entry was barred.
Appellee was not yet aware, however, the seriousness of his actions.
31.

After the Utah Bar contacted Appellee regarding this incident at the prison, Appellee

researched disciplinary actions involving prison visits by suspended attorneys. Only then was Appellee
fully aware of the seriousness of his actions and found himself defenseless as to this issue. Appellee's
only redeeming quality throughout his prison stay was his complete lack of intent to hide his
suspension status. When confronted by the prison supervisor, Appellee readily admitted his status
and reaffirmed that he simply didn't know if his status would bar his entry. At no time did Appellee
verbally deny his status or attempt to explain away the reason his status was listed with the Utah Bar
as suspended. This lack of intent to deceive, however, and inability to make seemingly simple
alterations to small and simple decisions made throughout this encounter, is wholly illustrative of
Appellee's disability status. No amount of explanations were able to remove the cloud of deception
surrounding Appellee's visit to the prison as interpreted by the Utah Bar and accepted by the District
Court.
32.

In measuring Appellee's actions in light of proper sanctions for such behavior, it is apparent

that Appellee's acts were far removed from those attorneys' noted in other cases of disciplinary action
9

resulting in disbarment. In those actions, attorneys clearly intended, and went to ridiculous and
laughable levels of deception, to hide their suspended status from prison officials in attempts gain
access to clients. Appellee made it quite clear that it was never his attempt to hide his suspended
status and when confronted, Appellee stated directly that he was in fact suspended and that he simply
was not aware if that would bar him from entry. In other cases, suspended attorney's would make
various statements as to why it appeared their status was suspended, but that such information was
incorrect and out dated, or various other false claims in their attempts to gain entry. Appellee signed
some forms he should not have signed, and directly admitted his suspended status the first time
anyone asked his if he was suspended.
33.

The second (2) issue in which the court found Appellee in contempt related to Appellee's filing

of a motion on behalf of a client during his suspension. Prior to Appellee's suspension, he filed a
motion to Set Aside a court's order to dismiss a client's personal injury case, to which opposing
counsel responded in opposition to the motion; all prior to Appellee's initial suspension. Appellee
subsequently filed a Reply to defendant's opposition and filed the Reply on April 22, 2002, during
Appellee's suspension.
34.

Appellee realized his error during the actual hearing on the Motion to Vacate which was held

on June 25, 2002, following Appellee's reinstatement on June 1, 2002. At those proceedings,
Appellee was reviewing the documents during Defendant's oral argument and noticed that the Reply
and Certificate of Mailing were signed on the 22 day of April 2002. Appellee immediately recognized
the significance of this error and was dumfounded as to how it happened as he clearly recollected
completing the Reply in March, well before his suspension was to begin as to prior clients.
35.

Appellee testified that he quite clearly recalled he had researched and drafted the Reply
10

memorandum during the last week of March of 2002. Appellee was facing a five (5) day deadline
following the filing and service of defendant's Opposition to defendant's motion that he received on
March 19,2002. Additionally, Appellee distinctly recalled that he completed the motion BEFORE
the actual winding down period was exhausted; which served as an additional yet private deadline for
the filing of the Reply.
36.

Appellee also clearly recalled that during his suspension, and in reviewing this particular case,

he found the Reply he had drafted still in the client's file and that the Reply did not have a Certificate
of Mailing attached to the end of the Reply which itself had been signed the last week of March.
Appellee was understandably concerned that the Reply may not have actually been filed as the five
(5) day deadline for filing a reply had passed. Appellee checked with the court to see whether he had
in fact filed the document, and if not, whether defense counsel had submitted a Notice to Submit
thereby cutting off Appellee's right to file the Reply. Appellee discovered that he had not filed the
Reply with the Court, but also that opposing counsel had not yet filed a Notice to Submit.
37.

Appellee therefore reprinted the last page of the Reply and added the Certificate of Mailing.

Appellee believed he could do such a task as this particular task was something anyone could do or
declare and was clearly something that did not require an attorney. When Appellee added the
Certificate of Mailing to the Reply, however, he erroneously pasted a Certificate of Mailing to the
last page, and deleted the date and signature line of the Reply itself. The only remaining date and
signature block on the Reply therefore was the one following the Certificate of Mailing, giving the
impression that the signature following the Certificate is also the signature and date of the Reply
itself, said signature and date occurring AFTER Appellee's suspension.
38.

This particular offense on the part of Appellee is a model representation of the difficulties
11

Appellee had in dealing, or in working, with his combined disabilities. During Appellee's testimony,
as he relayed this story regarding the filing of the Reply, he seemed completely unaware that he had
committed any offense that would rise to the level of contempt. While being cross-examined by Ms.
Toomey, Appellee was asked whose name was on the top of the Reply. Appellee comfortably
answered that it was his own name. Ms. Toomey then asked what was stated on the next line, and
it was at this particular moment that Appellee realized the obviousness of his error and that he had
in fact acted in contempt of the court's order, as the next line of the Reply read "attorney for plaintiff."
39.

It was only during Appellee's cross examination that he realize that regardless of when he

researched and drafted the Reply, by filing the Reply in April, he was holding himself out to the court
as an attorney at the time of the filing. Appellees rambling explanation as to when he actually
researched and drafted the Reply was completely irrelevant. Yet, prior to the cross-examination,
Appellee could not determine on his own why the physical filing of the Reply was an act done in
contempt of the court's order of suspension.
40.

Appellee's final act of contempt (3) arose from his contact with a person who claimed he was

grievously injured due to medical malpractice. The court determined that a great deal of the contact,
or the significant portion of contact, occurred during Appellee's suspension and was therefore done
in contempt of the Court's order.
41.

Again, as in the previous actions, Appellee was full of his own reasoning as to why his contact

with this potential client was within the boundaries of the suspended lawyer. In particular, Appellee
testified that the initial contact came many months before his suspension.
42.

Regardless of the dispute as to when the initial contact occurred, testimony clearly showed

that contact also occurred during the time of Appellee's suspension. Appellee stated during the
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suspension that he dropped off reading materials to the client but claimed that the material was simply
general information on medical malpractice claims that was freely available on the Internet and
therefore he was not providing counsel to the client. Appellee's reasoning was that his carefully
construed actions were within the limits allowed as he was careful to refrain from acting as an
attorney in providing only general information at the client's home, took pictures for a "potential"
action, and didn't begin acting as an attorney until the representation agreement was signed a few days
after the suspension was lifted.
43.

During cross-examination, Appellee was presented with a copy of the general information he

provided his potential client, and at the top of this general information was the address of Appellee,
and under this name, the statement "attorney at law." As with the Reply, Appellee had a visible
reaction to this obvious error in his analysis, as again, he believed he had been careful to technically
follow the court's order of suspension, only to be shown the error of his actions. It was not simply
the documents itself, but the timing of the contacts that should never have occurred during the
suspension and therefore an obvious violation of the court's order and clearly an act of contempt.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's mood throughout the life of this case gives the impression that the Court has but
two options: 1) Disbarment, Appellant's particular favorite; and, 2) Suspension. Appellant fails to
realize the logical conclusion therefore blindly follows that the attorney in error, who commits a
violation of a Court's order of suspension, MUST be disbarred as the Court's earlier attempt at
punishment and reform failed, leaving but one conclusion for the errant attorney.
The Standards For Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Rule 3, allows and directs the Judge to
consider more than the simple demands of Appellant in rendering its decision. Given the facts
13

presented at the hearing, as noted herein, the lawyer's mental state and mitigating factors are
particularly pertinent in carefully fashioning sanctions to match the given misconduct. The Judge
therefore has many options when determining what sanction should match the given misconduct; 1)
from varying lengths of suspension, 2) to the capital punishment of the legal profession, disbarment.
The District Court therefore did not err by imposing an additional and much lengthier
suspension on an attorney, a solo practitioner, found to have violated the Court's previous order of
suspension, even when the additional suspension is four fold that of the first as a greatly magnified
sanction is particularly warranted when the violation or injury to the legal system shows of a complete
lack of respect to the legal profession or causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the public
in general.
ARGUMENT
I.

An Attorney Who Had Been Sanctioned with a Three Month Suspension for
Professional Misconduct Who Then Engages Acts that Constitute the Practice of Law
During Said Suspension Can Only Be Properly Sanctioned by Imposing a More Severe
Penalty Than the Initial Suspension, as in the Case at Bar Where the Sanction Imposed
was Four-Fold That of the Original Sanction, as Such Actions Demonstrate a
Fundamental Lack of Respect to the Profession.

In all three of the issues in which the court found Appellee in contempt, the prison, the filing
of the Reply, and Appellee's contact with a potential medical malpractice client, Appellee had what
he thought to be clear answers as to why his actions were within the court's order. Only when his
actions were directly and vigorously debated, did Appellee realize the obviousness and seriousness
of his errors.
Yet, if Appellee's motivation and intent to comply were indeed as genuine as he vigorously
claimed, such actions and reasoning show a troubling inability to properly apply his power of
14

reasoning to seemingly simple situations. The questions raised by Appellee's health provided the
District Court ample evidence that factors exist relating to Appellee's mental state and were in fact
a proper factor for consideration in apply sanctions under Rule 3.1(b) and therein evidence pertinent
to the court's exercise of applying mitigating factors in the case at bar.
II.

A One Year Suspension, as Ordered by the District Court, is the Appropriate
Discipline for Appellee's Misconduct
In evaluating the facts and applying the rules and sanctions available, the District Court

properly determined that Appellee be suspended for the period of one year. This amount of time
gives Appellee the time he needs to carefully evaluate his own situation and take the necessary steps
to either re-enter the practice of law, or whether the practice of law is outside his physical and mental
abilities. Additionally, the sanction itselfjudiciously meets the requirements of justice in meting out
punishment for acts outside the standards set for those empowered with the responsibility of serving
the public in the capacity of a licensed attorney in the State of Utah.
CONCLUSION
Justice under the United States system of law requires vigorous combat between opposing
forces allowing impartial judges and juries to work and see through the impassioned arguments of
all parties and find the calm sea of fact and truth. Truly impassioned parties are easily blinded by their
passions and can err in their assessments of justice, of proper conclusions, or even the subtle
differences that lead to choices of what is right and what is wrong.
In the case at bar, Appellant, in her impassioned cry for career capital punishment, finds fault
in Appellee's use of the Judicial system in fighting for what he believes is just, under the facts. To
fashion a valid argument for disbarment, Appellant alleges fraud or deception, not in the actions of
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Appellee prior to the hearing from which this appeal arises, but from the testimony of Appellee during
the hearing itself wherein Appellee dared to argue the facts presented by Appellant. This desperate
grasp for victory is itself a deception on the part of Appellant in that the appeal before this great body
of justices must arise from the allegations and rulings presented and rendered at the hearing; and not
from new allegations Appellant wishes to charge against Appellee under the guise of the appeal
presented to this Court, charges that were not presented, addressed or ruled upon by the District
Court. This Court, therefore, must not give any weight whatsoever to Appellant's new charges of
fraud or deceit, but must rule based on the record, the facts, the factors, and the careful review and
judgment by an honorary member of the bench in the Second Judicial District Court, the honorable
Judge Pamela.
Appellee confidently presents to this Honorable body that The District Court did not err by
imposing an additional and much lengthier suspension on an attorney, a solo practitioner, found to
have violated the Court's previous order of suspension, even when the additional suspension is four
fold that of the first; as a greatly magnified sanction is particularly warranted when the violation or
injury to the legal system shows of a complete lack of respect to the legal profession or causes injury
or potential injury to a party or to the public in general.
DATED this 18th day of July 2003.

Russell T. Doncouse
Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 18th day of July 2003.1 personally delivered, by first class mail
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postage paid a true and correct copy of the preceding Appellee's Brief to the following:
Kate A. Toomey
Deputy Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Russell T. Doncouse
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